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This paper explores the e⁄ect of a potential joint-venture breakup on the level of
technology transfer in a set-up with exploration-exploitation trade-o⁄s in the pres-
ence of time compression costs. We consider a joint-venture relationship between a
technologically advanced multinational ￿rm and a local ￿rm operating in a developing
economy where the ability to enforce contracts is weak, and the local ￿rm can quit
without penalties. The multinational ￿rm has to consider the advantages and disad-
vantages of an intensive transfer of technology versus an extensive one. In response to
the breakup incentives, the multinational ￿rm reduces the intensity (lowering the pace)
and opts for a more extensive transfer mode (longer duration of transfer), compared
to the ￿rst best. The scheme is supported by a ￿ ow of side payments to encourage
the local ￿rm to stay longer. We show that a fall in time compression costs may in-
crease or decrease the intensity of technology transfer, both in the ￿rst-best and in
the second-best scenarios, depending on the nature of the saving in time-compression
costs.
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11 Introduction
Technology transfer from developed economies to less developed ones has been an important
engine of growth of emerging market economies. A common mode of technology transfer is
the setting up of a joint venture between a multinational and a local ￿rm1. Governments
of emerging market economies often encourage such joint ventures. In fact, the Chinese
government does not allow foreign car manufacturers to have their own subsidiaries in China.
It requires foreign car manufacturers to form joint ventures (JVs) with local ￿rms so that
the latter can bene￿t from technology transfer. In addition, foreign car manufacturers must
obtain the Chinese government￿ s permission to form JVs.
A salient feature of international joint ventures is that breakup typically happens within
a few years. The local partner may have strong incentives to break away, once it has accu-
mulated su¢ cient technological knowledge. A multinational ￿rm that o⁄ers a joint venture
contract to a local ￿rm must take into account the possibility of such opportunistic be-
havior. The breakup of joint ventures or similar collaborative agreements has been widely
reported. Easterly (2001, p. 146) recounted that Daewoo Corporation of South Korea and
Bangladesh￿ s Desh Garment Ltd. signed a collaborative agreement in 1979, whereby Dae-
woo would train Desh workers, and Desh Ltd would pay Daewoo 8 percent of its revenue.
Desh cancelled the agreement on June 30, 1981 after its workers and managers have received
su¢ cient training. Its production soared from 43,000 shirts in 1980 to 2.3 million in 1987.
(Interestingly, of the 130 Desh workers trained by Daewoo, 115 eventually left Desh to set
up their own ￿rms.).
This paper considers the e⁄ect of an anticipated breakup on the manipulation of actual
breakup time via distorting the level of technology transfer. We assume the multinational
￿rm always honors its promises (because it wants to maintain its reputation in other coun-
tries), but it cannot prevent the local ￿rm from breaking away after receiving technology
transfer.
The problem for the multinational ￿rm is to give an incentive to the local ￿rm to stay
longer, because after the breakup, it will be obliged to stop production in the host country,
while the local ￿rm will gain by using the acquired knowledge as a stand-alone ￿rm. Incen-
tives for the local partner to stay longer can be either in the form of a large ￿ ow of side
payments or a promised increase in the transfer of knowledge before the break (which, if
not well-designed, can become itself an incentive to leave sooner). In the ￿rst case, the local
1Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi (2005) review the principal channels of technology transfer, which are trade
in goods, foreign direct investment, licensing, labor turnover and movement of people.
2￿rm will bene￿t a lot before the breakup, while in the second case the local ￿rm will reap
a large pro￿t after the breakup. In this context, within a ￿xed horizon, a ￿rst key feature
of our model is to know how the multinational will balance between an intensive and an
extensive mode of knowledge transfer. Given a total amount of knowledge to be transferred,
at one extreme one can choose a highly intensive transfer mode (a fast rate of transfer over
a short period of time) and at the other extreme, one can opt for an extensive transfer mode
(a slow transfer rate over a long period of time). Then, if the transfer of knowledge is too
intensive, the local ￿rm will quit sooner to bene￿t alone, for a longer time, of a large total
amount of knowledge accumulated before the breakup. In this case the pro￿t for the multi-
national will be of short duration. Furthermore, the breakup time being not contractible,
the multinational ￿rm may have to rely on second-best technology transfer schemes that do
not maximize joint surplus, but that are incentive compatible.
In our model three key features of technology transfer play a major role: it is costly, it
takes time and it generates value.
i) it is costly: the faster the pace of knowledge transfer, the more costly it is. Indeed,
there are "time-compression costs" (Dierickx and Cool,1989) and absorptive capacity costs
(Cohen and Levinthal,1990). For a given total amount of knowledge to be transferred, the
shorter the interval of time the multinational spends to transfer it, the greater will be its
transfer cost.
ii) it takes time: time is an essential element here. The earlier the breakup, the more time
would be available for the local ￿rm to reap the rewards of value creation, and the shorter
is the phase of positive pro￿t for the multinational. This is a speci￿c form of the famous
"exploration-exploitation" trade-o⁄ (March,1991) where the opportunity cost of exploring
(learning) is the reduced time for exploitation for the fully acquired knowledge2. In our
model, exploration represents, for each unit of time until the breakup, a transfer of knowledge,
while exploitation is the ability to reap some pro￿t. The multinational will not be able to
exploit after the breakup, while the local ￿rm can exploit both before and after the breakup.
The resolution of this trade-o⁄, the right balance between exploration and exploitation,
depends on what type of knowledge is involved: knowledge in the sense of information ("to
know what"), or knowledge in the sense of ability to act ("to know how", learning by doing or
2March de￿ned exploration and exploitation as follows: ￿Exploration includes things captured by terms
such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, ￿ exibility, discovery, innovation. Exploita-
tion includes such things as re￿nement, choice, production, e¢ ciency, selection, implementation, execution￿
(1991, p. 71). Levinthal and March added that exploration involves ￿a pursuit of new knowledge,￿whereas
exploitation involves ￿the use and development of things already known￿(1993, p. 105). In general explo-
ration means learning (by imagination, evaluation, building competences and human capital, by imitation
or introspection). In our case it represents a transfer of knowledge.
3by thinking). Knowledge can be more or less tacit. To be able to use it an agent can imitate
the ￿teacher￿ , or the teacher must codify the knowledge to be transferred, changing tacit
knowledge into explicit knowledge. There is also the need for a preparation phase (building
absorptive capacities). The costs of transferring knowledge include costs of achieving mutual
understanding, of improving assimilation capabilities, codi￿cation costs, etc.
iii) it generates value: the more knowledge the multinational transfers before the breakup,
the larger is the joint pro￿t per unit of time before the breakup, and the larger is the stand-
alone pro￿t of the local ￿rm after the breakup.
In this dynamic context, our paper explores the e⁄ect of a potential joint-venture breakup
on the level of technology transfer in a set-up with exploration-exploitation trade-o⁄s in the
presence of time compression costs and imperfect property rights. Thus, supported by a
side-payment scheme, the nature of transfer costs will determine the optimal intensive vs.
extensive mode of transfer, the total amount of knowledge transferred before the breakup
and the optimal breakup time.
We will compare the ￿rst-best and second-best cases by asking the following questions:
(i) if ￿rst-best contracts are not implementable, is the speed of technology transfer reduced?
(ii) Is the cumulative amount of technology transfer lower under the second-best scheme?
(iii) Does the side payment increase over time to give an incentive to delay the breakup ?
(iv) How do exogenous changes in transfer cost impact the time pro￿le of transfer ?
In response to breakup incentives, we show that the multinational ￿rm transfers technol-
ogy in a less intensive but more extensive way compared to the ￿rst-best. The scheme is
supported by a ￿ ow of side payments to encourage the local ￿rm to stay longer. We show
that a fall in time compression costs may increase or decrease the intensity of technology
transfer, both in the ￿rst-best and in the second-best scenarios, depending on the nature of
the time compression costs economies, the length of the time horizon and on the maximum
absorptive capacity.
We formulate a dynamic model of principal-agent relationship in which at any point of
time the agent (the local ￿rm) can quit without legal penalties. An interesting feature of
the model is that the agent￿ s reservation value is changing over time, because the agent￿ s
knowledge capital increases with the accumulated amount of technology transfer. The agent￿ s
quitting value (i.e., how much it can earn as a stand-alone ￿rm over the remaining time
horizon) is a non-monotone function of time. Given a planned time path of technology
transfer, during the early phase of the relationship, the local ￿rm￿ s quitting value is rising
with time. However, near the end of the time horizon, when the transferred knowledge would
4become useless because a new product (developed elsewhere) renders the existing product
completely obsolete, the local ￿rm￿ s quitting value is falling over time. Because of this
non-monotonicity of quitting value, the local ￿rm￿ s optimal quitting time (in the absence of
side transfer payments) occurs before the projected end of the ￿rst-best relationship. Such
an early breakup may be prevented if the principal (the multinational) designs a suitable
scheme in which both the pace and aggregate amount of technology transfer deviate from
the ￿rst-best, and a suitable ￿ ow of side payments to encourage the local ￿rm to stay longer.
Our model is linked to two streams of the literature. The ￿rst one focuses on the de￿nition
and properties of the costs of technology transfer, while the second stream, typically relying
on two-period formulation, concerns the technology transfer within a joint venture.
Our assumptions on the costs of technology transfer are based on empirical ￿ndings.
An early paper that discussed the resource cost of transferring technology know-how was
Teece (1977). Teece disagreed with the ￿common belief that technology is nothing but a
set of blueprints that is usable at nominal cost to all￿ . He argued instead that ￿the cost
of transfer, which can be de￿ned to include both transmission and absorption costs, may
be considerable when the technology is complex and the recipient ￿rm does not have the
capabilities to absorb the technology￿ . His empirical research focused on measuring the costs
of transmitting and absorbing all of the ￿relevant unembodied knowledge￿ . These costs fall
into four groups. First, there are pre-engineering technological exchanges, where the basic
characteristics of the technology are described to the local ￿rm. Second, there are costs of
transferring and absorption of the process or product design, which require ￿considerable
consulting and advisory resources￿ . Third, there are ￿R&D costs associated with solving
unexpected problems and adapting or modifying technology￿ . Fourth, there are training
costs, which involve extra supervisory personnel. Teece found that empirically the resources
required for international technology transfer are considerable and concluded that ￿it is
quite inappropriate to regard existing technology as something that can be made available
at zero social cost￿ . Niosi et al. (1995) found that technology transfer costs are signi￿cant
and mostly concentrated in training. A central aspect of our model consists of exploring
the implications of the time-compression cost of technology transfer. The following speci￿c
example illustrates. Take the transfer cost function C(h) = b(h=h)￿ where 0 ￿ h ￿ h is the
amount of transfer per unit of time, and ￿ ￿ 1 is the degree of convexity. A strictly convex
cost (￿ > 1) means marginal cost of transfer increases with h. The parameter ￿ represents
an index of time compression3. We show how an increase in ￿ (which may come about from
3See Attouch and Soubeyran (2006, 2008).
5exogenous changes in communication technology) may a⁄ect the equilibrium transfer rate
in the ￿rst-best (perfect property rights) and in the second-best (imperfect property rights)
scenarios. We also examine a fall in b which represents a global fall in the time-compression
cost. Results on the impact of a fall in transfer cost on the equilibrium amount of technology
transfer di⁄er, depending on whether a such a fall is caused by a rise in ￿ or by a fall in
b. Then, in modelling the endogenous pace and duration of technology transfer, our paper,
by seriously taking into account "time-compression costs", provides a useful framework to
investigate theoretical support for the hypothesis that the degree of intellectual property
protection in￿ uences the extent of technology transfer (for a survey of empirical evidence,
see Mans￿eld, 1994).4
The second major contribution of our model is an explicit account of the incentive prob-
lem of technological transfer in a dynamic setting. This topic has been considered by Ethier
and Markusen (1996), Markusen (2001), and Roy Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury (2001)
using two-periods models. The questions we wish to address, namely the determination of
the optimal and second-best pace of technology transfer, cannot be examined adequately
in a two-period model. With just two periods, one cannot model the "spreading" e⁄ect
(transferring knowledge over a longer period of time) and the e⁄ect of a reduction in transfer
cost on the timing and amount of technology transfer. Our model, set in continuous time,
is capable of generating a richer set of results. It enables us to show how to achieve the
balance between the intensive and the extensive modes of transfer, and to determine jointly
the optimal length of the transfer phase and the optimal total amount of knowledge to be
transferred (both in the ￿rst-best case and the second-best cases). Furthermore, our result
on non-monotonicity of the local ￿rm￿ s value of quitting as a function of quitting time can-
not be obtained in two-period models. This non-monotonicity has important bearing on the
principal￿ s optimal speed of technology transfer. There are two important considerations
here. On the one hand, ￿rst-best e¢ ciency requires trading o⁄ higher absorption cost asso-
ciated with faster transfer against higher bene￿t of knowledge accumulation. On the other
hand, a high speed of transfer brings the local ￿rm￿ s optimal quitting time closer to the
present, which is detrimental to the multinational.
Ethier and Markusen (1996) presented a model involving a race among source-country
￿rms to develop a new product that becomes outdated after two periods.5 The winning ￿rm
4By emphasizing the time-compression cost, our model di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the licensing models (e.g.
Kabiraj and Marjit (2003), Mukherjee and Pennings (2006)) in which technology transfer is via licensing,
which does not use up real resources.
5With this assumption, the time horizon of a ￿rm is e⁄ectively restricted to two periods.
6has the exclusive right to produce the good in the source country (S), and can produce the
good in the host country (H) either by setting up a wholly owned subsidiary, or by licensing
to a local ￿rm. If the licensing contract is for one period, in the following period the former
licensee, having learned the technology, can set up its own operation to compete against
the source-country ￿rm. Two-period licensing is ruled out because by assumption the local
￿rm can breakaway in the second period without penalties. The authors assume that in the
host country there is complete absence of protection of intellectual property. Their model
highlights the interplay of locational and internalization considerations. It provides a key to
understand why there are more direct investment between similar economies. Their paper
does not address the issue of endogenous timing of breakaway by the local partner of a joint
venture, nor the issue of the multinational￿ s optimal speed of technology transfer that serves
to counter the breakaway incentives.
Markusen (2001) proposed a model of contract enforcement between a multinational ￿rm
and a local agent. He considered a two-period model where the agent learns the technology in
the ￿rst period and can quit (with a penalty) and form a rival ￿rm in the second period. The
multinational can ￿re the agent after the ￿rst period and hire another agent in the second
period. A main result is that if contract enforcement induces a shift from exporting to local
production, both the multinational ￿rm and the local agent are better o⁄. Markusen￿ s paper
does not address the issue of the optimal speed of technology transfer.
Roy Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury (2001) built a model of joint venture breakdown.
They used a two-period setting, with a multinational ￿rm and a local ￿rm. They showed
that for intermediate levels of demand, there is a joint venture formation between these ￿rms
in period 1, followed by a joint venture breakdown in period 2 (when the two ￿rms become
Cournot rivals). In their model, the incentive for forming a joint venture is that both ￿rms
can learn from each other (the local ￿rm acquires the technology while the multinational
learns about the local labor market). The model does not allow the multinational to control
the speed of technology transfer.
In the papers mentioned above, by restricting to two-period models, the question of
optimal timing of breakup cannot be studied in rich detail. Among papers that deal with
optimal timing decisions of multinational ￿rms is Buckley and Casson (1981). They analyzed
the decision of a foreign ￿rm to switch from the ￿exporting mode￿to the FDI mode (in setting
up a wholly owned subsidiary). That paper did not deal with the problem of opportunistic
behavior that would arise if there were a local partner. Horstmann and Markusen (1996)
explored the multi-period agency contract between a multinational ￿rm and a local agent
7but in their model there was no technology transfer from the former to the latter. Their
focus was to determine when a multinational would terminate its relationship with the local
sales agent and establish its own sales operation. Rob and Vettas (2003) generated the
time paths of exports and FDI, with emphasis on demand uncertainty and irreversibility.
They did not consider the possibility of licensing or joint venture. Horstmann and Markusen
(1987) explored a multinational ￿rm￿ s timing decision on investing (setting up a wholly
owned subsidiary) in a host country in order to deter entry. Lin and Saggi (1999) explored
a model of timing of entry by two multinationals into a host country market, under risk of
imitation by local ￿rms. There was no contractual issues in their model; the emphasis was
instead on the leader-follower relationship. They showed that while an increase in imitation
risk usually makes FDI less likely, there exist parameter values that produce the opposite
result.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
and characterizes the ￿rst-best pace of technology transfer when contracts are perfectly
enforceable, so that a joint-venture breakup is not allowed. Section 3 shows that if breakup
can happen without penalties, and the local ￿rm faces a credit constraint, then the ￿rst-best
pace of technology transfer is not an equilibrium outcome, because the multinational would
want to modify the pace of technology transfer in order to (partially) counter the incentives
of breakaway. We ￿nd that the equilibrium outcome under credit constraint and imperfect
property rights involves a slower pace of technology transfer, and also results in a lower
cumulative technology transfer.6 Section 4 shows that without credit constraint or with
perfect property rights the ￿rst-best pace of technology transfer is the equilibrium outcome.
Section 5 shows how an exogenous fall in transfer costs (e.g. because of reduced barriers to
communication) a⁄ects the equilibrium transfer rate as well as the total amount of transfer.
The Appendices contain proofs.
6This may be interpreted as the unwillingness to transfer the latest technology. In Glass and Saggi
(1998)￿ s general equilibrium model, the quality of technology that FDI transfers depends on the size of the
technology gap between the North and the South. Empirical work by Coughlin (1983) found that comparing
countries that are not favorable to FDI that set up wholly owned subsidiaries with countries having less
restrictive FDI policies, the ￿rst group of countries tend to receive process rather than product technology
transfers, and the product technology transfers tend to concentrate on older products.
82 The Basic Model
2.1 Assumptions and Notation
We consider a developing country in which a good can be produced using local inputs (such as
labor and raw material) and technological knowledge which can be transferred from a foreign
￿rm. Unlike most existing models which assume that the technology transfer can happen
immediately, we take the view that there are absorption costs and training costs which rise
at an increasing rate with the speed of technology transfer, and which make an once-over
technology transfer unpro￿table. We therefore explicitly introduce time as a crucial element
in our model. We take time to be a continuous variable, t 2 [0;T]. Here T is an exogenously
given terminal time of the game. It can be interpreted as the time beyond which the product
ceases to be valuable (cf. the product cycle theory of Vernon).
Let h(t) denote the rate of technology transfer at time t: The state of technological
knowledge of the local ￿rm at time t is denoted by H(t) where H(t) =
R t
0 h(￿)d￿. The
(reduced-form) ￿gross pro￿t￿ of the joint venture at time t is assumed to be a function
of H(t) alone. It is denoted by ￿(H(t)) where ￿(:) is a continuous, concave and strictly
increasing function, with ￿ = 0 if H = 0. This gross pro￿t does not include ￿absorption
cost￿which is denoted by C(h(t)). We assume that C(h) is continuous, strictly convex and
increasing in h, with C(0) = 0. This implies that for all h > 0, the marginal absorption
cost is greater than the average absorption cost, C0 > C=h. We also assume that there is an
upper bound on h, denoted by h > 0.
Let us make the following speci￿c assumptions:
Assumption A1: (a) The di⁄erence between marginal absorption cost and average absorp-
tion cost, C0(h)￿C(h)=h, is positive and increasing in h for all h > 0. (b) T￿0(0) > C0(0) ￿ 0.









Assumption A3: The elasticity of marginal contribution of technology to pro￿t is less than










￿2 > 0 (3)
Clearly, the function C(h) = bh￿ (where ￿ > 1 and b > 0) satis￿es A1(a). Assumption A1(b)
means that the return (over the life-time of the joint venture) of a very small technology
9transfer is higher than its marginal cost. Assumption A2 ensures that the optimal constant
h is strictly smaller than h.7 Assumption A3 implies that t￿0(ht) is increasing in t. We use
this assumption to prove the optimal solution is unique (see Proposition 1 below) and to
show that the equilibrium outcome under credit constraint and imperfect property rights
results in a lower cumulative technology transfer (see section 3.4). Clearly, the function
￿(H) = (K=￿)H￿ where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 and K > 0 satis￿es A3.
We assume that the foreign ￿rm and the local ￿rm form a joint venture. We ￿rst consider
the ideal case where contracts can be enforced costlessly. In this case the joint venture
chooses a time path of technology transfer and production that maximizes the joint surplus.
In analyzing this ideal case, our focus is on e¢ ciency. The surplus sharing rule under this
￿rst-best scenario is not important for our purposes.
After characterising the ￿rst-best (e¢ cient) time path of technology transfer, we discuss
whether this path can be achieved if the local ￿rm can at any time break away from the
joint venture and become a stand-alone entity that captures all the post-breakaway pro￿t
(we assume that after the breakaway, the joint venture vanishes, and the multinational ￿rm
leaves the host country). The answer will depend on what kind of contracts are feasible,
in particular, on whether the local ￿rm has access to a perfect credit market, and whether
the multinational is entitled to compensation by the local ￿rm after the breakaway (i.e.
whether property rights are perfectly enforceable). In the absence of a perfect credit market
and a perfect property rights regime, we show that the foreign ￿rm must design a second-
best contract. We show that the second-best contract involves a slower pace of technology
transfer, and a lower level of cumulative technology transfer. We argue that this outcome
could be detrimental to the host country.
2.2 The ￿rst-best solution
For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate is zero. The joint-surplus maximization




[￿(H(t)) ￿ C(h(t))]dt (4)
subject to _ H(t) = h(t), H(0) = H0 = 0 and 0 ￿ h ￿ h.
Let us simplify the problem by restricting the set of admissible time paths of technology
transfer, so that it consists of the following two-parameter family of piece-wise constant
7As shown in the Appendix, assumption A2 can be replaced by a weaker assumption.




h if t 2 [0;tS]
0 if t 2 (tS;T] (5)
where tS is the ￿technology-transfer-stopping time￿ , beyond which there will be no further
technology transfer, and h is a constant transfer rate, to be chosen. After the time tS, the
level of technological knowledge of the joint venture is a constant, denoted by HS where
HS ￿ htS.The optimization problem of the joint venture then reduces to that of choosing




[￿(ht) ￿ C(h)]dt + [T ￿ tS]￿ (htS) (6)
subject to 0 ￿ h ￿ h and 0 ￿ tS ￿ T.
Proposition 1: The solution of the (￿rst-best) optimization problem (6) of the joint venture
exists, is unique, and has the following properties:
(i) The rate of technology transfer h￿ during the time interval [0;t￿
S] is strictly positive and
strictly below the upper bound h.
(ii) The stopping time t￿
S is strictly positive and is smaller than the time horizon T:
(iii) The marginal bene￿t (over the remaining time horizon) of the technological knowledge
stock at the stopping time t￿










(iv) At the optimal technology transfer rate h￿, the excess of the marginal absorption cost over
the average absorption cost is just equal to average of the marginal contribution of technology



















Proof : See Appendix 1.
Remark 2: Since C(h) > 0 for any h > 0 and H(0) = 0, the assumption that ￿(H) = 0
when H = 0 implies that, for any h > 0, there exists an initial time interval called the
8In the companion paper, the optimal path h￿ (t) looks similar. It is maximal during the ￿rst few periods,
then gradually decreases, becoming zero strictly before the horizon T. The main di⁄erence appears in the
determination of the optimal second best ￿ ow of side payment wC (:). Indeed, when h(t) can vary from one
period to the next, the multinational can induce the local ￿rm to delay the breakaway by accelerating the
technology transfer instead of increasing the ￿ ow of side payments.
11￿loss-making phase￿over which the joint venture￿ s net cash ￿ ow, ￿(ht) ￿ C(h), is negative.






ft 2 [0;T] : ￿(ht) < C(h)g
￿
(9)
Example 1: Assume ￿(H) = K ￿ (1=￿)H￿ where K > 0, 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 and C(h) = (c=￿)h￿
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T = 30;￿ = 1;￿ = 2;c = 1;K = 2 40 20 10
Example 1b
T = 30;￿ = 1
2;￿ = 2;c = 1;K = 2 ’ 5:04 18 2
Example 1c
T = 30;￿ = 1;￿ = 5
4;c = 1; K = 0:1 ’ 39 10 10
2.3 Implementation of the ￿rst best when the local ￿rm cannot
break away
Denote by V (h￿;t￿
S) the net pro￿t of the joint venture under the ￿rst-best solution. Let us
assume that the local ￿rm would form a joint venture with the foreign ￿rm only if the payo⁄
to the owner of the local ￿rm is at least equal to its reservation level RL. We consider only the
case where RL < V (h￿;t￿
S). Assume there are many potential local ￿rms. Then the foreign
￿rm will o⁄er the local ￿rm the payo⁄ RL, and keep to itself the di⁄erence V (h￿;t￿
S) ￿ RL.
Suppose it is possible to enforce a contract that speci￿es that the joint venture will not
be dissolved before the end of the ￿xed time horizon T. Then the foreign ￿rm will be able to
implement the ￿rst best technology transfer scheme that we found above. In the following
sections, we turn to the more interesting case where the local ￿rm is not bound to any
long-term contract.
123 Joint venture contracts when the local ￿rm can break
away
We now turn to the real world situation where the local ￿rm can break away at any time,
taking with it the technological knowledge that has been transferred, without having to
compensate the multinational. For simplicity, we assume that after the breakaway, the
multinational is unable to produce in the host country. The local ￿rm can break away at
any time 0 ￿ tB ￿ T and become a stand-alone ￿rm in the local market, bene￿ting from
the cumulative amount of technology transfer up to that date, H (tB). In this section, we
assume the following market failures:
Credit market failure (C1): The local ￿rm cannot borrow any money, hence the multina-
tional has to bear all the losses of the joint venture during the loss-making phase [0;t+ (h)],
where t+(h) is as de￿ned by equation (9) (the multinational ￿rm is not subject to any credit
constraint). The multinational ￿rm cannot ask the local ￿rm to post a bond which the latter
would have to forfeit if it breaks away (the local ￿rm cannot raise money for such a bond).
Property rights failure (C2): The multinational cannot get any compensation payments
from the local ￿rm after the breakaway time tB.
Without the credit market failure, the multinational ￿rm would be able to ask the local
￿rm to pay as soon as it receives any technology transfer. Without the property rights
failure, the prospect of having to compensate the multinational would deter the local ￿rm
from breaking away. Let us make clear the meaning of (C1) and (C2) above by describing
the payo⁄ function of the multinational and that of the local ￿rm.
We assume that the multinational ￿rm can credibly commit to honor any contract it
o⁄ers. This assumption seems reasonable, because multinational ￿rms operate in many
countries and over a long time horizon, so it has an interest in keeping a good reputation.
Then we can without loss of generality suppose that the multinational o⁄ers a contract which
speci￿es that it collects all the pro￿ts of the joint venture, and pays the local ￿rm a ￿ ow of
side payments w(t) for all t until the local ￿rm breakaway.
After the breakaway, if C2 does not hold, the multinational can successfully ask for a
￿ ow of compensation payment ￿(t) from the local ￿rm, to be paid from tB to T. In the rest
of this paper we analyse di⁄erent situations where the ￿ ows w(:) and ￿(:) are constrained.















[￿(H (t)) ￿ ￿(t)]dt: (14)
The payo⁄ implications of the market failures (C1) and (C2) are described below.
C1: The local ￿rm cannot borrow: In this case, at all time t, the local ￿rm￿ s cumulative
net cash ￿ ow up to time t, denoted by NL(t); must be non-negative. Thus












[￿(H (￿)) ￿ ￿(￿)]d￿ if t 2 (tB;T]
(15)
C2: The multinational cannot obtain from the local ￿rm any compensation payment
after the breakaway time:
￿(t) = 0 for t 2 (tB;T] (16)
The goals of this section are (a) to show that when both constraints (15) and (16) hold
the ￿rst-best technology transfer scheme is in general not achievable, and (b) to characterize
the second-best technology transfer scheme. In a later section, we will point out that if one
of these two assumptions is completely removed, the ￿rst-best can be recovered.
3.1 Technology transfer with two market imperfections
We now consider the case where the local ￿rm can break away, there is no credit market,
and the multinational cannot get any side payment after the breakaway.
Using the constraint that ￿(t) = 0 and the fact that ￿(H (t)) ￿ 0, the borrowing con-




w(￿)d￿ for all t 2 [0;tB]: (17)
For simplicity, from this point we assume that the reservation value RL is 0. Then the
participation constraint VL ￿ RL is satis￿ed when the borrowing constraint (17) holds.






[￿(H (t)) ￿ C(h(t)) ￿ w(t)]dt (18)







w(￿)d￿ + (T ￿ t)￿(H(t))
￿
(19)






h if t 2 [0;min(tS;tB)]
0 if t 2 (min(tS;tB);T] (20)
3.2 The local ￿rm￿ s secure payo⁄
Let us consider what would happen if during the pro￿t-making phase, the multinational ￿rm
takes 100% of the pro￿t and does not make any side transfer to the local ￿rm. Under this
scenario, clearly the local ￿rm has an incentive to break away at or before the time tS (after
tS, it has nothing to lose by breaking away). The local ￿rm wants to choose a breakaway
time tB 2 [0;tS]. Given that w(:) = 0 identically, the payo⁄ to the local ￿rm if it breaks
away at time tB is
V
0




htB if tB < tS
htS if tB ￿ tS
(22)
Here the superscript 0 in V 0
L indicates that the local ￿rm￿ s share of pro￿t before the breakaway
time is identically zero. Given (h;tS), the local ￿rm knows that if it breaks away at time
tS, it will get (T ￿ tS)￿(htS). If it breaks away at some earlier time tB < tS, it will get
(T ￿ tB)￿(htB). The local ￿rm must choose tB in [0;tS], to maximize
R(h;tB) ￿ (T ￿ tB)￿(htB) where tB 2 [0;tS] (23)
Lemma 1: Given that w(:) = 0 identically (i.e. there is no side transfer from the multina-
tional to the local ￿rm),
(i) If
(T ￿ tS)￿
0(htS)h ￿ ￿(htS) ￿ 0 (24)




0(htS)h ￿ ￿(htS) < 0 (25)
the local ￿rm will break away at a unique b tB(h); strictly earlier than the planned transfer-
stopping time tS; and earn the (secure) payo⁄
V L(h) ￿ (T ￿ b tB(h))￿(hb tB(h)): (26)
15(iii) In both cases, a small increase in h will increase the local ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ by
￿
T ￿ b tB(h)
￿
￿0(hb tB(h))b tB(h) >
0 where, in the ￿rst case, b tB(h) = tS, and in the second case, b tB(h) satis￿ed the interior ￿rst
order condition:
(T ￿ b tB(h))￿
0(hb tB(h))h ￿ ￿(hb tB(h)) = 0 (27)
Proof: The function R(h;tB) is strictly concave over (0;tS); because
@2R(h;tB)
(@tB)2 = (T ￿ tB)￿
00(htB)h
2 ￿ 2￿
0(htB)h < 0 (28)
Consider the derivative of R(h;tB) with respect to tB;
@R(h;tB)
@tB
= (T ￿ tB)￿
0(htB)h ￿ ￿(htB) (29)
Thus if (T ￿ tS)￿0(htS)h ￿ ￿(htS) ￿ 0 then, due to the strict concavity of R(h;tB) in tB;
we know (T ￿ tB)￿0(htB)h ￿ ￿(htB) > 0 for all tB < tS, and it follows that the local ￿rm
will choose tB = tS. If (T ￿ tS)￿0(htS)h ￿ ￿(htS) < 0 then R(h;tB) attains its maximum
at some tB < tS. To prove (iii), note that in the case of b tB = tS (corner solution), if
after a small increase in h, the corner solution b tB = tS remains optimal, then @V L(h)=@h =
￿
T ￿ b tB(h)
￿
￿0(hb tB(h))b tB(h) where b tB(h) = tS. In the case of an interior solution, b tB(h) < tS,
di⁄erentiation of (26) gives
@V L(h)=@h =
￿
T ￿ b tB(h)
￿
￿
0(hb tB(h))b tB(h) (30)
+
￿
(T ￿ b tB(h))￿
0(hb tB(h))h ￿ ￿(hb tB(h))
￿ dtB
dh
But the term inside the curly brackets f:::g is zero. This concludes the proof.
Remark 3: Strictly speaking, the (secure) pro￿t should be written as
V L(h;tS) ￿ (T ￿ b tB(h;tS))￿(hb tB(h;tS))): (31)
However, this formalism is quite unnecessary.
Example 2: Use the speci￿cation of example 1. Independently of the value of h, if tS >
￿
￿+1T
;condition (25) is satis￿ed, and the local ￿rm will break away at b tB =
￿
￿+1T < tS . If
tS ￿
￿
￿+1T, condition (24) is satis￿ed, and the local ￿rm will break away at b tB = tS (see
Appendix 2).
Using the parameters of example 1a, the interior-breakaway condition (25) becomes tS >
15. In Figure 1, the curve V (h￿;tS); where h￿ = 40; shows that the multinational payo⁄
under the ￿rst-best scenario is single-peaked in tS, and its optimal tS is t￿
S = 20: Now, given
h￿ = 40 and t￿
S = 20, under the imperfect property rights regime, the local ￿rm can break
16away at time tB and earns a payo⁄ R(h￿;tB). We ￿nd that R(h￿;tB) is non-monotone in
tB: if the local ￿rm (￿rm L) breaks away too early, it has too little knowledge capital to
take away. If it breaks away too late, it has a lot of knowledge capital to take away, but too
little remaining time before the end of the time horizon. The local ￿rm will break away at
b tB (h￿) = 15. This shows that the ￿rst-best scheme in example 1a, (h￿;t￿
S) = (40;20); is not
implementable (in the absence of any side payment).
Fig. 1: Case where the local ￿rm breaks away before the ￿rst best transfer-stopping time.
(b tB (h￿) < t￿
S)
(T = 30; ￿ = 1, ￿ = 2, c = 1; K = 2; h = h￿ = 20).
Using the parameters of example 1c condition (24) becomes tS ￿ 15. This shows that the
￿rst-best scheme in example 1c, (h￿;t￿
S) = (39;10) is implementable (but the multinational
does not get the pro￿t that it would get if the joint venture were a wholly owned subsidiary).











Fig. 2: Case where the local ￿rm breaks away at the ￿rst best transfer-stopping time
(b tB (h￿) = t￿
S = 10).
(T = 30; ￿ = 1, ￿ = 5
4, c = 1; K = 0:1; h = h￿ ’ 39)
Figure 2 illustrates the case where the local ￿rm would prefer that the transfer stops
later than the ￿rst-best stopping-time, so that when it breaks away it will get a higher
stock of knowledge. The local ￿rm￿ s preferred transfer stopping-time is t = 15. But, since
the multinational chooses to stop the technology transfer at t￿
S = 10, the local ￿rm has an
incentive to break away at the same time.
173.3 Incentive compatible contract under credit constraint
Given that the local ￿rm must have non-negative cash ￿ ow at all time, and that, in the
absence of transfer payment from the multinational, it can secure the pro￿t V L(h) = (T ￿
b tB(h))￿(hb tB(h)) by breaking away at an optimal day, the multinational ￿rm must design a
contract (with transfer payments) that maximizes its payo⁄, subject to the constraint that
the local ￿rm earns at least V L(h).
In the absence of side payments, if the local ￿rm stays with the joint venture until a
later date tC
B > b tB(h), it loses an amount V L(h) ￿ (T ￿ tC
B)￿(htC
B). (Here, the superscript
c in tC
B indicates that it is induced by a contractual ￿ ow of side payments, as will be seen
below.)Therefore, if the multinational wishes to induce the local ￿rm to break away no
sooner than tC
B, it has to pay the local ￿rm a compensation F equal to the loss of delaying
the breakaway, V L(h) ￿ (T ￿ tC
B)￿(htC
B).
More precisely, given any desired date tC
B > b tB(h), we can show that there exists a
multiplicity of ￿ ows of side payments wC (:) (see Appendix 4) such that (a) the local ￿rm,
responding to such incentives, will choose to break away at time tC
B and (b) the total side
payment is minimal with respect to the incentive constraint and the borrowing constraint.













B) = V L(h) (32)
These ￿ ows have the same present value. The only di⁄erence between the various incentive-
compatible ￿ ows wC (:) is how the ￿ ow is spread out between b tB(h) and tC
B. The intuition is
as follows.
Firm M (the multinational) can o⁄er to pay ￿rm L (the local ￿rm) a lump sum F at
a contractual time tC
B if L actually breaks away at time tC
B or at any later date, so that
￿rm L￿ s total payo⁄ is F+ (T ￿ tC
B)￿(htC
B). If L breaks away at any time tB before tC
B,
it will simply get the payo⁄ R(h;tB) = (T ￿ tB)￿(htB). Since L can always ensure the
payo⁄ V L(h) by breaking away at time b tB(h), ￿rm M￿ s o⁄er would be accepted only if F+
(T ￿ tC
B)￿(htC
B) ￿ V L(h).
Alternatively, instead of giving the lump sum F at the time tC
B, ￿rm M can spread
the payment of this total amount over time, from time b tB(h) to time tC
B, and still ensure
that ￿rm L has no incentive to break away before tC
B. Recall that F = V L(h) ￿ R(h;tB),
and that R(h;tB) is decreasing in tB for all tB > b tB(h). So, for any sequence of dates
18ft1 < t2 < t3 < ::: < tng where b tB(h) < t1 < tn = tC
B, it holds that
F = [V L(h) ￿ R(h;t1)]
+[R(h;t1) ￿ R(h;t2)] + ::: + [R(h;tn￿1) ￿ R(h;tn)] (33)
￿ F1 + F2 + :: + Fn (34)
where each Fi is positive. Firm M can then o⁄er the following contract to ￿rm L: I will pay
you Fi at time ti if up to time ti you are still part of the joint venture. Clearly, breaking
away at any time t ￿ tC
B does not give ￿rm L any advantage in comparison to staying in the
joint venture until time tC
B.
The above argument supposes that payments are made in small amounts at a large
number of discrete points of time. We can take the limit as the size of these time intervals
go to zero, and n goes to in￿nity. This yields a continuous ￿ ow wC(t) such that wC(t) =
￿
dR(h;t)
dt > 0 for t 2 (b tB(h);tC






All the above side transfer payments schemes have the same e⁄ect on the local ￿rm￿ s quit-
ting time. We can therefore focus, without loss of generality, on the following particular ￿ ow
of side payments (which concentrates at a point of time, i.e. the ￿ ow becomes a mass). The
multinational o⁄ers to pay the local ￿rm a lump sum amount F ￿ 0 if the latter breaks away
at a speci￿ed time tC
B . Since the multinational does not want to overpay the local ￿rm, the
lump sum F will be just enough to make the local ￿rm indi⁄erent between (a) breaking away
at b tB(h) thus earning the secured pay-o⁄ V L(h), and (b) breaking away at the contractual
breakaway time tC












B) = V L(h).
Therefore the side payment written in the contract is
e w(tB) =
￿








B) if tB = tC
B
(35)
Let us now make use of the incentive constraint (35) to determine the multinational￿ s
optimal choice of both h and tC













B) ￿ V L(h) (36)













C) = 0 (37)
This condition has the same form as the ￿rst best condition (see equation (7)), except of











































Example 3: Using the parameters of example 1b, b tB (h) = 10; then V L(h) = 40
p
10h.













Fig. 3: The secure value of the local ￿rm and the pace of technology transfer.
(T = 30; ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1
2, c = 1; K = 2; t = t￿
S = 18)
Figure 3 illustrates that, given the ￿rst best transfer-stopping time t￿
S = 18, if the local
￿rm can secure V L(h) (which is increasing in h), the multinational has an incentive to reduce
the pace of technology transfer to h ’ 3:93 lower than h￿ ’ 5:04.
3.4 Comparison with the ￿rst best
In this sub-section, we show that the second-best scheme described above implies that i) the
multinational will choose a slower transfer rate hC < h￿ and ii) the cumulative technology
transfer is also lower. We prove this for the general case (where the pro￿t function ￿(H) is
concave), and provide an explicit solution for the case of a linear pro￿t function ￿(H) = KH,
K > 0 in Appendix 3.
First, let us show that the two equations (37) and (39) yield (hC;tC




S) is the solution of the system of ￿rst order conditions in the ￿rst best



















S = 0 (40)
20@VM
@tS







￿) = 0 (41)
To show that hC < h￿ and tC
B > tS, we use the following method. Let ￿ be an indicator,










T ￿ b tB(h)
￿
￿
0(hb tB(h))b tB(h) = 0
W2 ￿ (T ￿ t)h￿
0(ht) ￿ C(h) = 0 (43)
Clearly, if ￿ = 1, the system (42)-(43) is equivalent to the system of equations (37)-(39) and
thus yield (h;t) = (hC;tC
B), and if ￿ = 0, the system (42)-(43) is equivalent to the system of
equations (41)-(40) and thus yield (h;t) = (h￿;t￿
S). For an arbitrary ￿ 2 [0;1], the solution





We now show that e h(￿) is decreasing in ￿ and e t(￿) is increasing in ￿. Let W11 be the
partial derivative of W1 with respect to h, W22 be the partial derivative of W2 with respect
to t, W12 be the partial derivative of W1 with respect to t, etc. Then we have the following


























Now, by the second order condition, W11W22 ￿ W21W12 > 0: Hence de h=d￿ is negative if and
only if ￿W1￿W22 < 0
Now W1￿ = ￿
￿
T ￿ b tB(h)
￿
￿0(hb tB(h))b tB(h) < 0, and by the second order condition W22 <
0. This proves that e h(￿) is decreasing in ￿.
We now show that W21 < 0, where W21 = ￿C0 + (T ￿ t)(ht￿00 + ￿0).Using (43),
￿C






where the strict inequality follows from the assumption on C(h): average cost is smaller than
marginal cost. It follows that W21 < 0. This proves that e t(￿) is increasing in ￿.
21Let us compare the total quantity of technology transfer in the ￿rst best case H￿ ￿ h￿t￿
S
and the quantity in the second best case HC ￿ hCtC
B. Let e H (￿) ￿ e h(￿)e t(￿). Then
















e tW22 ￿e hW21
i
: (49)
Since ￿W1￿ > 0 and W11W22￿W21W12 > 0, d e H=d￿ is negative if and only if
h
e tW22 ￿e hW21
i
is negative. This term can be rewritten as
e tW22 ￿e hW21 = e H
h
￿￿
















e tW22 ￿e hW21 = e h
￿
C
0 ￿ (T ￿ e t)￿
0 ￿ e t￿
0￿
: (51)









d￿ ￿ e t￿
0( e H): (52)
Using (42) we obtain
e t￿
0( e H) ￿ C









T ￿ b tB(e h)
i
￿
0(e hb tB(e h))b tB(e h): (53)




: Using this inequality and (51), we get
e tW22 ￿e hW21 < 0:This proves that HC < H￿.
The following proposition summarizes the ￿nding of this section:
Proposition 2: To counter the local ￿rm￿ s opportunistic behavior, the multinational ￿rm
designs a second best scheme that involves a slower rate of technology transfer (thus reducing
the local ￿rm￿ s secure payo⁄) and a lower total cumulative technology transfer. It also o⁄ers
side payments to the local ￿rm to delay the breakaway time. The side payments can be in the
form of a continuous ￿ow that increases with time, or a lump sum payable at a contracted
breakaway time.
Example 4: Use the parameters of example 1a.





















Fig. 4: The secure value of the local ￿rm and the pace of technology transfer.
(T = 30; ￿ = 1, ￿ = 2, c = 1; K = 2)
Figure 4 shows that the maximum joint pro￿t is smaller in the second-best scheme (see
the two curves at the top of ￿gure 4, from the dash curve to the thick curve). To counter
the local ￿rm￿ s incentive to quit early (at b tB (h￿) = 10), the multinational ￿rm reduces
the pace of technology transfer from h￿ = 40 to hC ’ 16:8 (see the two curves at the
bottom of ￿gure 3, from the dash curve to the thick curve) while increasing the technology
transfer stopping time from t￿
S = 20 to tC










4 Implementation of ￿rst-best technology transfer with
one market imperfection
In this section, we brie￿ y indicate that if we relax one of the two assumptions C1 or C2,
there exists a contract which implements the ￿rst best technology transfer.
Case A: Perfect credit market and no compensation payment after the breakaway
Assume that the local ￿rm is not liable to make compensation payments after the break-
away time, i.e. C2 holds: ￿(t) = 0 for all t between tB and T. The multinational asks the
local ￿rm to pay it up-front the value of the joint venture, V (h￿;t￿
S), and gives the local ￿rm
the right to collect at each point of time t in (0;t￿
S) the net cash ￿ ow ￿(h￿t)￿C(h￿). Hence
the local ￿rm￿ s breakaway at time t￿
S as it has to solve the ￿rst best program.
Case B: Imperfect credit market and compensation payment must be made after
the breakaway





￿)]dt < 0; (54)
and gives the local ￿rm the right to collect the positive cash ￿ ow ￿(h￿t) ￿ C(h￿) for all
t between t+ (h) and t￿
S. In return, the local ￿rm must, during the phase [t+(h);T] , pay




[￿(h￿t) ￿ C(h￿)]dt in such
a way that the local ￿rm￿ s net cash ￿ ow is non-negative at each point of time.
5 The E⁄ect of a Fall in Transfer Costs on the Intensity
of Technology Transfer
In this section, we obtain some comparative static results on parametric changes on the
technology-transfer cost function, explain their e⁄ects on the duration and the pace of tech-
nology transfer. The parametric changes may be interpreted as changes in transfer costs of
a given technology, or as a comparison of di⁄erent transfer costs associated with di⁄erent
technologies. Transfer costs may fall because of an exogenous change in communication
technology. Does a fall in transfer costs a⁄ect the ￿rst-best and second-best intensity of
transfer in the same way? In this section, we show how an exogenous fall in transfer costs
may impact the intensity of technology transfer, both under the ￿rst-best scenario (perfect
property rights) and under the second-best scenario. For simplicity, we will assume the
pro￿t function is linear, ￿(H) = KH, and consider two di⁄erent interpretations of a ￿fall in
transfer cost￿ . We call these Type I and Type II fall in transfer cost, respectively. In both
cases, the upper-bound on feasible transfer rate is denoted by h.
5.1 Type I fall in transfer costs
Consider the convex transfer cost function C(h) = b(h=h)￿ where ￿ > 1 and b > 0. Then
C(0) = 0 and C(h) = 1. An increase in ￿ is called a Type I fall in transfer costs. It has two




. We call this the ￿cost-saving e⁄ect￿ .
Second, when ￿ increases, the marginal cost of transfer becomes lower for small h (near
h = 0) but it becomes higher for h near the upper-bound h.9 We call this the ￿convexity-











24modifying e⁄ect￿ . Intuitively, the ￿rst e⁄ect favors an increase in h, i.e., a speeding-up of
technology transfer, and the second e⁄ect favors an increase in h if h is small, and a decrease
in h if h is large. What is the net e⁄ect on h? We can show that the answer depends crucially
on the size of two exogenous variables, namely the maximum feasible transfer rate h, and
the length of the time horizon, T. We obtain the following results (the proofs of which are
in Appendix 5).
Result A1 (on transfer rate)
In the ￿rst-best scenario, a Type I fall in transfer cost (an increase in ￿) will result in
a lengthening of the transfer phase, [0;t￿
S]: It will also result in an increase of transfer rate
(i.e., an increase in h) in the case where h or T are small enough so that hT ￿ b=K).
However, in the case where hT > b=K, an increase in ￿ will result in an increase in h only
if the existing ￿ is greater than a threshold level e ￿; if ￿ < e ￿, a small increase in ￿ will
result in a decrease in h.10
The intuition behind Result 1 is as follows. If hT is small, then the optimal h￿ is small,
therefore the ￿convexity-modifying e⁄ect￿works in the same direction as the ￿cost saving￿
e⁄ect. If hT is large, then the optimal h￿ is large, therefore ￿convexity-modifying e⁄ect￿and
￿cost saving￿e⁄ect work in opposite directions. The cost saving e⁄ect is stronger only if ￿
is large enough.
Result A2 (on ￿rst-best accumulated transfer)
The e⁄ect of a Type I fall in transfer cost on total transfer, h￿t￿
S, depends on the size of
the maximum feasible accumulated transfer hT. If hT ￿ b=K, then h￿t￿
S will increase with
￿. If hT > b=K, an increase in ￿ will lead to an increase in h￿t￿
S only if the existing ￿ is
greater than a threshold level b ￿ < e ￿; if ￿ < b ￿, a small increase in ￿ will lead to a decrease
in h￿t￿
S.
For ￿ > e ￿, an increase in ￿ increases both h￿ and t￿
S (from Result A1 above) so clearly
h￿t￿
S increases. Given hT > b=K, if ￿ 2 (b ￿; e ￿) the t￿
S-lengthening e⁄ect of a small increase
in ￿ outweighs the h￿-decreasing e⁄ect of a small increase in ￿, therefore h￿t￿
S increases,
while if ￿ < b ￿ the latter e⁄ects dominates, so h￿t￿
S decreases.
Result A3 (on the second-best case)11
(i) In the second-best scenario, a Type I fall in transfer cost (i.e., an increase in ￿) will
increase the ￿contractual￿breakup time tC
B.
is positive for h near h and negative for h near zero.
10The threshold level is dependent (in fact increasing) in hT. Note also that we assume an interior solution,
h￿ < h, for which it is necessary and su¢ cient that 2￿ ￿ 1 > hTK=b.




S is greater than unity; it decreases if ￿ increases.
(iii) The ratio hC=h￿ is smaller than unity; it increases if ￿ increases.
(iv) If hT ￿ b=K, then, hC increases with ￿.
(v) If hT > b=K, there exists e ￿c > 1 such that hC increases with ￿ for ￿ ￿ e ￿c.
(vi) If hT > 1
2￿
p
2b=K, there exists ￿ such that hC decreases with ￿ for ￿ 2 (1;￿) and
increases with ￿ for ￿ > ￿.
5.2 Type II fall in transfer costs
In the example considered above, it was assumed that C(h) = b(h=h)￿ where ￿ > 1 and
b > 0. Clearly a decrease in b also represents a fall (but of a di⁄erent type) in transfer costs.
When b decreases, this reduces transfer cost at any given h, and unambiguously reduces the
marginal cost of transfer, regardless of whether h is near zero or near h.
When b decreases, there are two e⁄ects on the cost function. First, for h given, the cost
of transfer decreases. This e⁄ect tends to favor an increase in h. Second, the cost curve
becomes less convex, as marginal cost falls. This is the "convexity or curvature" e⁄ect. This
convexity e⁄ect favors an increase in h. In contrast to the previous example where there
were two e⁄ects that could go in opposite directions, here the two e⁄ects are going in the
same direction. This explains why our results (presented below) for a Type II fall in transfer
costs are not ambiguous. We obtain the following result (see Appendix 5).
Result B: In both the ￿rst-best and second-best scenarios, a Type II fall in transfer costs
(a decrease in b) will not a⁄ect the duration of the transfer (t￿
S and tC
B). It results in an





Our model seems to be the ￿rst theoretical formulation of the problem of choice of the pace
of technology transfer from a multinational ￿rm to a joint venture in a host country, with
special emphasis on the time-compression costs of technology transfer. We have shown that
when the host country cannot enforce joint venture contract, the multinational will have
an incentive to reduce both the pace of technology transfer and the cumulative amount of
technology transfer even if the duration of the transfer is longer. In other words, transfer
is both reduced and delayed. The sign of the comparative statics of a ￿fall in technology-
transfer costs￿on the pace of transfer (both in the ￿rst-best and second-best scenarios) is
26shown to depend on the life-span of the product, T, and the maximum feasible speed of
transfer, h.
A major implication of our model is that if the host country￿ s legal system is not su¢ -
ciently strong to prevent breakaway by local ￿rms, the multinational will reduce and delay
the technology transfer. To the extent that technology transfers in one industry have positive
spillover e⁄ects to other industries in the host country, this country loses out by its inability
to enforce contracts.
While the motive of our study is to shed light on technology transfer in a joint-venture,
clearly our model can be applied to other situations involving the stability of relationships,
such as employer-employee contracts, where the employee can learn from working in the ￿rm
and leave the ￿rm once he has accumulated su¢ cient human capital.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
The choice set ￿ de￿ned by ￿ =
￿
(h;tS) : 0 ￿ h ￿ h and 0 ￿ tS ￿ T
￿
is a compact set.
The objective function (6) is continuous in the variables h;tS over the compact set ￿. By
Weierstrass theorem, there exists a maximum, which we denote by (h￿;t￿
S).
Next, we show that the maximum must be in the interior of the admissible set ￿. Since
￿(0) = C(0) = 0 and T￿0(0) > C0(0) ￿ 0, the function V (h;tS) is strictly positive for some
positive h su¢ ciently close to zero, for all tS. Since V (0;tS) = 0 and V (h;0) = 0, it follows
that the optimum must occurs at some t￿
S > 0 and h￿ > 0. To prove (i) and (ii) above, it
remains to show that an optimum cannot occur at any point on the line tS = T nor on the
line h = h. To take into account the constraints T ￿tS ￿ 0 and h￿h ￿ 0, we introduce the




[￿(ht) ￿ C(h)]dt + (T ￿ tS)￿ (htS) + ￿(T ￿ tS) + ￿(h ￿ h) (A.1)









￿) ￿ ￿ = 0, (A.2)
￿(T ￿ t
￿

















S ￿ ￿ = 0, (A.3)
￿(h ￿ h) = 0; ￿ ￿ 0; h ￿ h
￿ ￿ 0
27Since C(h￿) > 0, condition (A.2) implies that T ￿ t￿
S > 0. (The intuition behind this result
is simple: there is no point to transfer technology near the end of the time horizon T). Thus








































which violates assumption A2.12 Thus h￿ < h. This concludes the proof that (h￿;t￿
S) is in






























It remains to verify the second order conditions. Recall that the FOCs at an interior
maximum is
V1 ￿ VtS = (T ￿ tS)￿
0 (htS)h ￿ C(h) = 0 (A.7)




0(ht)]dt + (T ￿ tS)￿
0 (htS)tS ￿ tSC
0(h) = 0 (A.8)
The SOCs are
V11 = ￿￿
0 (htS)h + (T ￿ tS)￿
00 (hts)(h)










00(h) + (T ￿ tS)￿
00 (htS)(tS)
2 < 0 (A.10)
￿ ￿ V11V22 ￿ (V12)
2 > 0 (A.11)
Clearly V11 < 0 and V22 < 0. It remains to check that ￿ > 0 at (t￿
S;h￿). Note that
V12 = (T ￿ tS)￿
00 (htS)htS + [(T ￿ tS)￿
0 (htS) ￿ C
0(h)] = (A.12)
















(making use of (A.4)).
Consider the curve tS =  (h) de￿ned by (A.7) in the space (h;tS) where h is measured















as h ! 0, tS ! T, and as tS ! 0, h ! e h where e h is de￿ned by T￿0(0) =
C(e h)
e h .



























C0(h) > C(h)=h, it follows that b h < e h. Thus the curve ￿(h) must intersect the curve  (h)
from above (at least once). At that intersection, the slope of the ￿(h) curve must be more








hence V11V22 > (V12)
2.Thus the SOC is satis￿ed at that intersection.
Finally, we can show that under assumption A3, the two curves ￿(h) and  (h) intersect
exactly once, that is, we show that ￿ > 0 whenever the FOCS are satis￿ed. It is easy to see
that A3 implies that t￿0 (ht) is an increasing function of t.
We note the following facts. First,
(V12)














































2 (T ￿ tS)
= [(T ￿ tS)￿
00 (htS)htS]
2 ￿ (T ￿ tS)￿
00 (htS)htS [￿















































































If A3 holds, t￿0(h￿t) is increasing in t (remark 1). Then ￿0 (htS)tS >
R tS
0 [t￿0(h￿t)]dt :We
conclude that ￿ > 0.
Appendix 2: The local ￿rm￿ s optimal breakaway time
Consider the isoelastic pro￿t function ￿(H) = (1=￿)H￿ where 0 < ￿ < 1. Then equation























Appendix 3: The incentive compatible contract when ￿(H) is linear
30The ￿rst order condition ((37) and (39))of the program can be rewritten as
K(T ￿ t
C























































































































￿ ￿ 1 +
q
(￿ ￿ 1)














￿ ￿ 1 +
p





















31where ￿ > 0 and
￿ ￿ 1 < 0 (A.44)















because ￿ < 1.
The optimal lump sum F is
F


























To prove that F ￿￿ > 0; it su¢ ces to show that b tB(hC) < tC
B . Using Lemma 1, part (i),
we know that b tB(hC) < tC
B if (T ￿ tC
B)￿0(hCtC
B)hC ￿ ￿(hCtC


















￿ ￿ 1 +
p






where the strict inequality follows from
2
p





2 + (￿ ￿ 0:5)
￿
> 1 (A.52)
which is true because ￿ > 1.)
Appendix 4: Properties of side transfer schemes
Consider a given contractual breakaway time tC
B with tC
B > b tB (h), where b tB (h) is the
￿default breakaway time￿found in Lemma 1, i.e, the time the local ￿rm would choose to
break away in the absence of the ￿ ow w(:). Given tC
B, the multinational will choose the
minimal total ￿ ow of side payment that satis￿es the incentive constraint, the participation










such that (a) the ￿ ow induces the local ￿rm to choose tC









w(t)dt + (T ￿ tB)￿(H(tB))
￿
(A.54)











Let wC (:) denote a solution of this program.(We allow the function w(t) to have a mass at
isolated points.)
Lemma 2: A ￿ow of side payments wC (:) is optimal if and only if the following conditions
are satis￿ed.




C (t)dt = 0; (A.56)
(b) the sum of the accumulated side payments and the local ￿rm￿ s stand-alone pro￿t after
tC









B) = (T ￿ b tB(h))￿(hb tB(h)) ￿ V L(h) (A.57)
(c) and, for any time t where b tB (h) ￿ t ￿ tC
B, the total payo⁄ to the local ￿rm is inferior





C (￿)d￿ ￿ (T ￿ b tB(h))￿(hb tB(h)) ￿ (T ￿ tB)￿(htB) (A.58)
Proof:
(i) Proof of su¢ ciency: It is easy to verify that when wC (:) satis￿es conditions (A.56),
(A.57) and (A.58) it is a solution of (A.53).
(ii) Proof of necessity: Consider a solution of (A.53). We show that it must satisfy
conditions (A.56), (A.57) and (A.58).
To show the necessity of condition (A.57), suppose that wC (:) does not satisfy condition
(A.57). If the left-hand side of (A.57) is strictly smaller than V L(h), the local would not
33choose tC
B and hence the incentive constraint (A.54) is violated. If the left-hand side of (A.57)
is strictly greater than V L(h), then the multinational can reduces it costs by o⁄ering less
side payments.
Next, we show the necessity of condition (A.58). If wC (:) does not satisfy the left
inequality of condition (A.58) then condition (A.55) is not satis￿ed. If wC (:) does not









C (t)dt > (T ￿ b tB(h))￿(hb tB(h)) ￿ (T ￿ e tB)￿(he tB) (A.59)
From the incentive constraint (A.54), from the local ￿rm￿ s point of view, by de￿nition of tC
B,
























C (t)dt + (T ￿ b tB(h))￿(hb tB(h)) (A.61)









C (t)dt > 0; (A.62)













C (t)dt + (T ￿ b tB (h))￿(hb tB (h))
> (T ￿ b tB (h))￿(hb tB (h)) (A.63)




Appendix 5: E⁄ects of reduced transfer cost on ￿rst-best and second-best trans-
fer schemes
Proof of Results A1-A2: For the cost function C(h) = b(h=h)￿ where ￿ > 1 and b >
0, consider an increase in ￿. The ￿rst-best FOCs give (K=b)(T ￿ t￿
S) = h￿￿1=(h)￿ and
(T ￿ t￿











If hTK=b < 2￿ ￿ 1 (condition for an interior solution), the optimal quantity of knowledge














































because lnx ￿ 1 + (1=x) > 0 for all positive x 6= 1.(Recall: let f(x) be a strictly concave
function, f(x) ￿ f(q) > f0(x)(x ￿ q) for x 6= q; take f(x) = lnx and consider x 6= q = 1,
then, applying the above inequality we get lnx ￿ 1
x (x ￿ 1) = 1 ￿ 1
x). The second term on




< 0. So the RHS of (A.64) is
















which is equal to zero at a unique ￿, say e ￿ > 1.
By a similar argument, if hTK=b ￿ 1; then the total cumulative technology transfer
H￿(￿) = h￿(￿)t￿
S(￿) increases with ￿; while if hTK=b > 1; there exists b ￿ > 1 such that
H￿(￿) decreases with ￿ for 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿; and H￿(￿) increases with ￿ for ￿ ￿ b ￿.
Proof of Results A3:









T ￿ b tB(h)
￿
￿
0(hb tB(h))b tB(h) = 0
(T ￿ t)h￿
0(ht) ￿ C(h) = 0 (A.66)









[(T ￿ tB)￿(htB)] =
T
2. Suppose for the moment that tC
B ￿ T
2 (we will later verify that this holds at the second-


















Remark that in this case, the only di⁄erence with the ￿rst best case is the constant term
￿
(KT)2
4 , hence the second order conditions are also satis￿ed.




￿ ￿ 1 +
q
(￿ ￿ 1)





￿ ￿ 1 +
q
(￿ ￿ 1)






De￿ne, for ￿ ￿ 1,
D(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿
r
(￿ ￿ 1)
















which is less than h, given that hT K





















2 + ￿ ￿ 1
2 ￿1 > 0 for all ￿ > 1. The ratio tC
B (￿)=t￿
S(￿) decreases with ￿.





. Its derivative is
’

















The ￿rst term is positive and the second term is also positive. So ’0 (￿) > 0.
Because the ratio
hC(￿)
h￿(￿) is increasing in ￿, it follows that when h￿(￿) is increasing in ￿,
hC (￿) must be increasing in ￿ at a faster rate. Now, for hT K
b ￿ 1, we conclude that hC(￿)
increases with ￿. For hT K
b > 1, then for ￿ ￿ e ￿, where e ￿ is the threshold beyond which
h￿(￿) increases with ￿, hC(￿) must be increasing in ￿. But clearly, by continuity, hC(￿)
must also be increasing in ￿ for all ￿ belonging to some range (￿; e ￿) where1 < ￿ < e ￿, and
36hC(￿) is decreasing in ￿ for all ￿ 2 (1;￿). Let us show the existence of this threshold ￿.













We can show that if hTK=b > 1
2￿
p
2, there exists e e ￿ > 1 (where e e ￿ < e ￿) such that b h(￿)
decreases with ￿ for 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ e e ￿; and b h(￿) increases with ￿ for ￿ ￿ e e ￿: Now de￿ne















Then ￿0(￿) < 0 for all ￿ > 1. So when b h(￿) is decreasing, hC (￿) must be decreasing at
a faster rate. And when b h(￿) is increasing, hC (￿) may be decreasing (at a slower rate) or
increasing. It follows that there exists a threshold ￿ 2
￿
e e ￿; e ￿
￿
such that hC (￿) is decreasing
if and only if ￿ < ￿.
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